The Baglihar Project
Negotiations between India and Pakistan during
1951-1960 held under the supervision of the World Bank resulted in
the signing of the IWT on 19 September 1960. This is the only treaty
between the two arch rivals that has worked effectively for over four
decades and is, at times, cited by international funding
institutions, as an illustration of cooperation between the two
hostile neighbours. The Indus system of rivers comprises three
eastern rivers - Sutlej, Beas and Ravi - and three western rivers -
Indus, Jhelum and Chenab. The Baglihar Hydropower Project (BHP) is
being undertaken on the River Chenab in Doda, 160 km north of Jammu.
Apart from objecting to the project design of the BHP, Pakistan has
expressed opposition to the Tulbul navigation project, Sawalkote
Hydroelectric Project and the Kishanganga Hydroelectric Project, all
located in J&K.
Under the IWT, the waters of the eastern
rivers are allocated to India and those of the western rivers, to
Pakistan. The average annual flow of waters in the eastern rivers is
estimated to be around 33 Million Acres Feet (MAF) whereas it is 135
MAF in the western rivers. The Pakistani contention over the BHP
relates to the Article V of the IWT which relates to the compensation
to be paid by India to Pakistan towards the latter's losses incurred
during the construction of water drawing projects on the western
rivers in lieu of water supplies for irrigation canals in Pakistan
which were dependent on the water flow from the eastern rivers. The
IWT allowed Pakistan to construct a system of replacement canals to
carry water from the western rivers into those areas in West Pakistan
that were earlier dependent for their irrigation supplies on water
from the eastern rivers. The Indian contention in this regard is that
since India has already paid its contribution of 62,060,000 pounds to
the World Bank towards compensation to Pakistan under this clause,
therefore, the Article V is no more valid. But Pakistani contention
is that the IWT had imposed some restrictions on India over the usage
of waters of the Indus, Jhelum and Chenab. Therefore, New Delhi
cannot alter the flow on any of these rivers.
In the years after the
IWT, Pakistan built the Mangla and Tarbela dams and several other
storage facilities on Indus, Jhelum and Chenab. India also embarked
on a series on construction projects including dams and barrages on
the Ravi, Sutlej and Beas rivers. While these projects did not lead
to any serious differences between the two neighbours, the BHP is
opposed by Pakistan which claims that India is attempting to divert
the water flow into Pakistan through this project.
J&K's
Initiatives
The J&K government had sought
counter-guarantees from the Centre for implementing major hydel power
projects in the State. However, due to a delay in the sanctioning of
such guarantees, the former Farooq Abdullah government signed a
memorandum of understanding (MoU) with Jai Prakash Industries Ltd,
Siemens and Hydro Vevey Ltd for completing the 450 (Megawatt) MW
Baglihar hydel power project. The MoU was signed on 11 April 1999.
The total cost of the project is estimated at about Rupees 3,800
crore and the project is expected to be completed by December 2004.
The J&K government has already provided Rupees 150 crores for the
project and work on the BHP began in May 1999. On 29 August
2003, the then Indian Prime Minister Atal Behari Vajpayee promised
his government's assistance for raising Rs. 2,200 crore for the
completion of the BHP. Around Rs. 1,600 crore has already been
allocated for the project by the J&K government and the remaining
amount would be generated with the help of the Centre and financial
institutions. Vajpayee also announced the sanctioning of the Rs. 665
crore Sea-II power project of 120 MW capacity to be undertaken in
Kashmir by the National Hydel Power Corporation (NHPC).
The
BHP will tap around 7,000 cusecs of water of Chenab for irrigation
purposes in the short-term and once the project is completed,
electricity would also be generated for meeting the shortfalls in the
State's power demands. The BHP would meet around one-third of the
total power requirements of J&K. The BHP project would also
provide employment to thousands of people living in the Ramban,
Banihal, Doda and Gulabgarh areas. Already, the BHP has generated
employment to 5000 skilled and unskilled workers. The project will
have an initial installed capacity of 450 MWs which could be
increased to 900 MW by an expansion programme. The Baglihar Dam will
be 144 metres high and the head race tunnel two km long and 10 metres
in diameter.
J&K is reported to have about 15,000
MW of power potential. In the past two decades, investments of over
Rs. 4000.00 crores have already been made in the power sector. During
1997-98 to 2001-2002, investments of Rs. 1,400 crores were made which
were markedly higher compared to previous years. Several debates over
the BHP in the Jammu and Kashmir Assembly raised the issue that there
is growing resentment amongst the people of the State over the
government's failure to harness the enormous hydroelectric power
potential. This is mainly because of the provisions of the IWT which
deny India the right to exploit common water resources. The Mufti
Sayeed government in J&K is keen on the Baglihar project as it
would help meet the power shortages in the State and contribute to
generating employment as well. With the growth in the population of
the State which has led to an increase in the demand for water for
irrigation and other purposes, officials of the J&K government
are of the view that the practical decision would be to either amend,
if not abrogate, the IWT.
Pakistani Opposition
Pakistan
contends that the BHP would lead to a reduction in the downstream
flow of water in the Indus as River Chenab is one of the important
water source for Indus. Moreover, Pakistan is also opposed to the
construction of the Wullar barrage which India is building on the
River Jhelum. Both India and Pakistan are also planning to build a
hydropower dam on the Neelum River (a tributary of River Jhelum).
Pakistan says that the BHP would increase India's storage capacity
(in J&K) to 1,64,000 acre feet which is much higher than that
allowed under the IWT. The BHP will also allow India to control the
flow of water to Pakistan's disadvantage. Pakistan further says that
the construction of the controversial gate structure at Baglihar
could deprive Pakistan of more than 7, 000 cusecs (cubic feet per
second) of water a day from the Chenab. Clearly, the BHP has become
the bone of contention between the two countries. Apart from the BHP,
Pakistan is opposing India's other water projects on the Indus saying
that these are in contravention of the IWT.
A three-member
Pakistani team of water and power experts headed by Jamaat Ali Shah,
Commissioner of the Permanent Commission on Indus Water (PCIW), had
inspected the BHP in October 2003. Such annual inspections have been
provided under the IWT. Following the inspection, the team presented
a report to the Pakistani government saying that India was building
the dam in contravention of the IWT clauses. Moreover, they also
claimed that India had not redesigned the BHP in accordance with
Pakistani conditions. In its report, the team stated that the BHP
would deprive Pakistan of 26 to 28 per cent water in winter season
thereby affecting Pakistan's irrigation water requirements especially
during the Rabi crop season [The Nation, 25 November 2003].
Bilateral Talks
The recent foreign secretary-level
parleys held in January 2005 failed to resolve the dispute as both
India and Pakistan remained stuck to their respective positions. The
talks were held between a 12-member Indian team led by Secretary
(Water Resources) V. K. Duggal and a Pakistani delegation headed by
Secretary (Water and Power) Ashfaq Mehmood. The discussions focussed
on six technical areas identified including the pondage level, the
gated spillway and the level of intake tunnels. While India stated
its readiness to re-examine Pakistani objections to the design of the
dam, Islamabad wants the project to be stopped as it fears that India
may eventually manipulate the flow of water, which could affect
agriculture in Pakistan. Moreover, a change in the water flow table
from India to Pakistan could add to the ongoing water-related
tensions between Pakistani provinces. With India showing no
concessions on the issue, Pakistan stepped up its campaign against
the project by briefing envoys from different countries, including US
and China, on 12 January 2005. However, Islamabad also assured the
foreign envoys that a failure in Baglihar talks would not affect the
ongoing composite dialogue process with India. The IWT provides that
disagreements by the parties on the interpretation of the provisions
of the Treaty are classified into three categories: questions are
examined by the PCIW; differences by a Neutral Expert; and disputes
by a Court of Arbitration. The fact that India and Pakistan have
failed to resolve the disagreements means that it would now be
referred to a 'Neutral Expert', either appointed by the two
countries, or by a third party agreed upon by the two sides. In the
absence of such an agreement, the appointment of the 'Neutral Expert'
would be made by the World Bank, in consultation with the two
countries. The decision of the Neutral Expert on all matters within
his competence shall be final and binding. If the 'Neutral Expert' is
of the view that the 'differences' between the two parties are to be
treated as a 'dispute', then a Court of Arbitration would be
established to resolve the matter.
The Way Out
The
PCIW, established under the IWT, includes experts on water and power
from both countries who meet annually in India and Pakistan
alternately for exchanging documents relating to the sharing of
common water resources of the Indus. Article IX of the IWT provides
that if the two sides are unable to resolve any dispute bilaterally
at the level of the PCIW, then a team of neutral experts or
arbitration should be used to resolve the problem. For India, there
are two options. First, India can go ahead with the project after
settling the dispute with Pakistan either bilaterally or by involving
the role of neutral experts for the first time in 42 years to resolve
the problem. The second option for India is to go ahead with the BHP
in accordance with its own designs and if met with opposition, New
Delhi should walk out of the IWT. The J&K Assembly debates over
the issue have reflected support for the second option. Though it is
clear that the IWT's greatest achievement is that it is the only
treaty that has withstood India-Pakistan hostility and also
depoliticised the water issue to a large extent, the treaty needs to
be amended taking into consideration the present requirements of the
Indian state of J&K. The Baglihar project will significantly
benefit the Kashmiri people by generating employment opportunities as
well as meet the power shortages in the state. Also, the Indian
leadership has reaffirmed that the project is not intended to either
dam the rivers or affect the flow of waters to Pakistan. Observers
therefore say that Pakistan's opposition to the project is
unwarranted and indicates that Islamabad is playing with the
aspirations of the Kashmiri people.